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Executive summary   
The political priorities1, set up by the incoming European Commission's President-elect 
Ursula von der Leyen, have put a clear goal to keep on maintaining Europe as a global 
champion and to revise its position within the changing geopolitical landscape. To do that, 
and to position itself correctly amongst the other global players, the EU needs to have 
access to holistic country-level information.  
In an increasingly interconnected and globalized world emerging new regional knowledge 
and power centres question the validity of the established international order. We are 
witnessing the emergence of multiple and diverse players. The willingness to find mutual 
interests with emerging global players is the only strategy for a 'win-win' situation within 
the multipolar globalisation.  
Advanced developing countries have accounted for almost two-thirds of the world’s GDP 
growth and more than half of new consumption over the past 15 years. Yet their global and 
regional influence varies substantially among individual countries. The benchmark against 
the GDP, notwithstanding widely acknowledged limitations, remains heavily embedded in 
talks amongst governments and interinstitutional meetings. Assessing country and 
regional strengths through a new holistic lens2 is a key to determine how to re-
engage ourselves within new arising power centres, whether embedded in the knowledge 
powered economies such as Singapore, or regional champions leading South-South and 
Triangular cooperation, as Chile.  
With the emphasis on new 21st century concerns, new arising global centres of excellence 
cannot be assessed only through the monetary value of goods and services over a certain 
time span. There are already many discussions about the shortcomings of the use of GDP 
as it sidesteps essential dimensions of a fair-society, sustainable development and the real 
improvement of quality of citizens' lives. Exposure to the effects of globalisation requires 
institutions to adapt and to facilitate actions on international, national and regional levels, 
adjusting to the new requirements and adopting regulatory frameworks that support a 
rapidly changing environment.  The definition of wealth therefore should be revised by 
taking into account not only the gross domestic production but also human and natural 
                                                 
1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf  
2 https://www.rethinkeconomics.org/  
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capitals and benefits deriving from these assets. With increasing government spending 
through procurements for highly specialized services, nowadays the competition is not 
just between the governments, but also between the businesses that possess 
strategically needed patents, competences and skills.  
Moreover, in the current globalised and interconnected environment, the issue of a 
country's strategic autonomy encompasses the entire spectrum of foreign policy and 
security, and not just dimensions of defence or trade, or any other singular element. It is 
therefore important to pull together a range of significant indicators and to asses 
emerging power centres and regional interdependences, as well as to evaluate 
critically countries' own strategic autonomy. But rather than implying autonomy, the 
notion of balance, dependence and interdependence in the highly interlinked and 
globalised environment should be looked at. 
In order to engage meaningfully with the advanced developing countries and to 
tailor bilateral and regional relationships it is therefore imperative to review available data 
and indicators for the sake of advancing policy-relevant knowledge. Such an 
interdisciplinary approach would combine existing knowledge with geographical 
factors such as location, geo-political interdependence, regional security, human 
development, economic stability and legal frameworks, as well as sustainability and how it 
affects the countries global and regional influence. In addition, with inclusion of future 
scenario modelling and geo-politics, it would allow to identify game-changing factors 
and to adjust more rapidly to contemporary shifts within the multipolar 
globalization, to build forecasts and to anticipate shifts of the entire spectrum of foreign 
policy relationships with those countries, aiming to promote EU's interests at the global 
stage. The above is what this study aims to accomplish.  
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1. Introduction 
The new European Consensus for Development3 was adopted in 2017 and is set firmly in 
the United Nation's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development4. It also recognises the 
changes taking place on a global scale and the need for a differentiated approach and 
relationship with more advanced developing countries. These countries can no longer 
be measured by previous standards. In the evolving global landscape some countries in 
Southeast Asia (for instance Malaysia or South Korea) and Central Asia (for instance 
Georgia, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan) have proved to be politically stable with steadily 
growing economies. Countries in Africa or Latin America are also developing at a different 
pace, with different success factors. Such changes imply different opportunities for 
bilateral or regional relationships between countries or private investors.  
The term BRIC5 was coined back in 2001 by the economic research division of Goldman 
Sachs6, when the accelerated growth of some emerging economies was surpassing that of 
the G77 members. At the end of the year 2000, BRIC countries together accounted for 
about 23.3% of the world's GDP. Their uneven performance, however, calls into question 
whether the term still reflects reality: by 2017 China's accelerated growth accounted for 
about a 73% share of the group8, but at the same time its GDP per capita in 2017 was still 
approximately similar to the other BRICS9. Also, with the new global players in Southeast or 
Central Asia, one could question whether the term BRICS is still applicable with political 
processes, governance and societal well-being changing so rapidly. The term itself 
therefore should be revised to take into account the newly emerging actors in the 
multipolar globalisation process and their regional and global influence.   
The International Panel on Social Progress 201810 observed that, due to globalisation, 
inequality between countries has narrowed since the 1980s. At the same time the macro-
level data at country level no longer accurately represents the situation within the country 
                                                 
3 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/new-european-consensus-development-our-world-our-dignity-our-future_en  
4 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E  
5 BRIC stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China; in 2010 South Africa joined the group, transforming the acronym 
into BRICS 
6 https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf  
7 G7 countries:  Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America  
8 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/09/why-china-is-central-to-global-growth  
9 http://www.statssa.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/BRICS-JSP-2018.pdf  
10 https://www.ipsp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/IPSP-Executive-Summary.pdf  
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where regional inequalities are becoming more noticeable (see also J.N. Pieterse, 201711, as 
well as Robert H. Wade, 201112, for a critical review). Thus describing, quantifying and 
measuring the success of countries remains at the core of discussions among 
academics and policymakers. The most frequently used criteria relating to markets, and 
economic performance expressed in GDP are no longer sufficient to provide a complete 
picture of country performance. Even if recently produced indices and rankings tend to go 
beyond GDP and include some additional criteria (like innovation indices, connectedness 
indices, government effectiveness or country stability), they still focus on a narrow part of 
people's lives. As is pointed out by alternative rankings, for example the World Happiness 
Report13, there are countries with a lower GDP (like Costa Rica or Mexico) with a higher level 
of perception of social well-being which is not reflected in GDP measurements but counts in 
a non-monetary subsistence economy of societal well-being.  
In addition, there is a knowledge gap between the perception and application of the 
principles of sustainability. The widely used and accepted benchmarks of GDP growth and 
ever-increasing industrial progress do not necessarily imply similar prospects for the long 
term. Sustainability seems to be perceived as an optional and costly condition, rather than 
as an opportunity for future job creation and balancing innovation and sustainability. The 
example of the hazards of accumulated electronic waste, created by technological 
innovation and increasingly short-term consumerism, could be addressed by more 
investment in the recycling industry and new job creation. Countries that adopt sustainable 
development principles are those to be watched for as potential long-term winners, 
tapping into new opportunities of green growth and balancing research, innovation, 
consumerism, well-being and environmental sustainability 14 . Deriving from the 
internationally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)15, the model of ‘doughnut 
economics’ is aiming to offer an alternative 'distributive' and 'regenerative' economic 
                                                 
11 Pieterse, J. N. (2017). Multipolar Globalization: Emerging Economies and Development. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
12 Wade, Robert H. (2011). ‘Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World 
Bank, and the IMF’. Politics & Society, 39(3), pp. 347–378. 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0032329211415503  
13 http://worldhappiness.report/ed/2018/  
14 http://sdgindex.org/  
15 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300  
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approach based on 'thriving instead of growing' and taking citizens' wellbeing as the core of 
governmental policies16.  
Despite widely acknowledged limitations, the benchmark of GDP remains heavily embedded 
in talks among governments and at interinstitutional meetings. But with the emphasis on 
new 21st century concerns, emerging new players on the global stage cannot be 
assessed only through the monetary value of goods and services over a given time 
span. Multiple and diverse players on the international stage have their own strengths and 
express differently their assertiveness. There is a need for different metrics as well as 
new definition and understanding of wealth and capabilities. Moreover, it is not 
sufficient to look at countries "emergence" factors unless there is an understanding of how 
these countries use their powers in the increasingly interdependent environment. 
There is a need to assess the country's own capability for strategic autonomy, its 
dependence and interdependence on others, stressing therefore the need to revise and 
adjust the whole foreign policy spectrum and its impact on internal policies.  
To engage meaningfully with the advanced developing countries and tailor bilateral and 
regional relationships, it is therefore imperative to review available data and 
indicators for the sake of advancing policy-relevant knowledge. Such an 
interdisciplinary approach would need to combine existing knowledge with geographical 
factors such as location, regional security, human development, economic stability and 
legal frameworks, as well as sustainability. In addition, the inclusion of future scenarios, 
modelling and considerations of geopolitics would make it possible to anticipate game-
changing factors and adjust more rapidly to contemporary shifts within the multipolar 
globalisation.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Raworth, K. (2017). Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist. Hartford: 
Chelsea Green Publishing  
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2. Emerging new power centres  
In recent decades many developing countries have grown faster than advanced countries, 
reclaiming their share of the globalised economy and using their cumulative voting power 
at the UN to form the G77 as a counterbalance to existing power structures. Yet global and 
regional influence varies substantially between individual countries (see the World Bank 
report on ‘The Changing Wealth of Nations 2018’17). Assessing the strengths of these 
countries and regions is therefore a key to determine how to reengage the EU within a 
context of newly arising power centres.  
Moreover, it is important to pull together the range of significant indicators and assess 
emerging new global power centres and regional interdependences, as well as to critically 
evaluate countries' strategic autonomy. Since the 1990s, the general global trend has 
been to ground global dominance on soft powers like international cooperation, talent 
attraction and influence through culture. Dr. Joseph Nye, Jr. has coined the term "soft 
power" in 1990s as "the ability to obtain preferred outcomes by attraction and persuasion 
rather than coercion and payment"18. He rightly anticipated19 that the diffusion of power 
will pass from governments to non-state actors ranging from large corporations to non-
profits and to informal ad hoc groups and that the third, "smart power", a combination of 
hard and soft approaches, will emerge. The decade between 2000 and 2010, indeed, 
witnessed ‘the inevitable return to rivalry’20 and the increase in the use of ‘terrorism’ as a 
key word in major foreign policy documents21. Since 2015 the trend towards assertiveness 
has been reflected in risk mentioning from increasing disruptions of the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution, technological advancements and national strategies aimed at renewal of 
military capabilities22.  
                                                 
17 The World Bank "The Changing Wealth of Nations 2018" 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29001  
18 Nye, J. S. (1990). Bound to lead. Basic Books.  
19 Nye, J.S. (2011). The Future of Power. PublicAffairs.  
20 Brookings Institution think tank: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-return-to-great-power-rivalry-was-
inevitable/  
21 "Our World in real time". Access GDELT 2.0 in Google BigQuery: Events, Mentions, Global Knowledge Graph.  
https://blog.gdeltproject.org/gdelt-2-0-our-global-world-in-realtime/ and "Open Repository Base on 
International Strategic Studies" ORBIS https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/  
22 "Our World in real time". Access GDELT 2.0 in Google BigQuery: Events, Mentions, Global Knowledge Graph.  
https://blog.gdeltproject.org/gdelt-2-0-our-global-world-in-realtime/ and "Open Repository Base on 
International Strategic Studies" ORBIS https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/ 
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The third "smart" power now combines innovation, information, access and outreach, and 
uses a combination of soft and hard power skills to assert autonomy, position and regional 
influence. Moreover, military and defence capabilities, combined with research and 
innovation capacities deriving from the human capital assets, are pointing to the new 
emerging technological hubs and centres of innovation. The 2019 GSMA mapping23 
pointed to the emerging innovation quadrangle in Africa: Nigeria (with 85 active tech hubs), 
South Africa (80 active tech hubs), Egypt (56 active tech hubs) and Kenya (with 50 active 
tech hubs). This would confirm the emergence of new tech hubs combining unique technical 
and economic power as a result of the available human capital and an enabling 
environment. Multinationals and innovative companies will soon hold a greater role in 
countries’ strategic autonomy while at the same time governments globally tend to 
outsource specialised technological or innovation capabilities to private firms (one example 
could be the US National Defence Strategy24 and budget allocation 201925 that point to 
increased spending on procurement and RDT&E, research, development, test, and 
evaluation). The competition is not just between states and their governments, but 
also between private companies possessing strategically needed patents, 
competencies and skills.  
Though the focus on smart power started in the developed countries, it does not exclude 
the Global South. Some of the emerging economies like India, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia and Uganda26 are currently rapidly renewing their military equipment and 
investing in hard power. For example, Bangladesh is implementing its forward looking 
Forces Goal 2030 roadmap27, aimed at renewing its military capacities given its geopolitical 
situation and proximity to India, Pakistan and China. The growing regional influence of the 
emerging economies and advanced developing countries cannot be ignored. 
Meaningful criteria to assess country-level performance should be pulled 
together for an impartial and inclusive overview that allows a critical 
assessment of their own strength, strategic autonomy and dependence on others 
                                                 
23 https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/blog/618-active-tech-hubs-the-backbone-of-africas-tech-
ecosystem/  
24 https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf  
25 https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/overview-of-the-2019-presidents-budget-request-for-defense  
26 https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp  
27 https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/bangladeshs-ambitious-military-modernization-drive/  
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in an increasingly interconnected and globalised environment. Strategic autonomy 
especially should be defined and clearly understood as an issue going beyond the economic 
or defence spheres, and encompassing the entire spectrum of foreign policy, based on soft, 
hard and smart power tools. The economic dimension, as part of ‘hard power’, should be 
assessed through an interdisciplinary approach combining sociology, environment, science28 
and innovation capabilities, combining multiple indicators, beyond aggregated GDP figures. 
In any case, the GDP does not reflect a country's reality, due to differences in urban and 
non-urban living standards as a result on increasing inequalities within the same country's 
boundaries29.  
Comprehensive and inclusive country-level information is thus the only way to position the 
EU correctly amongst the other global players and to "ensure that we uphold and update 
the rules-based global order".30 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 https://www.scimagojr.com/countrygraph.php  
29 Pieterse, J. N. (2017). Multipolar Globalization: Emerging Economies and Development. London and New 
York: Routledge.  
30 A Union that Strives for More, My Agenda for Europe, Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 
2019-2024, p.17.  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-
commission_en.pdf  
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3. Multiple indicators for a comprehensive assessment (how to identify emerging 
powers?) 
Many existing indicators provide sector specific information, which only partially capture the 
situation and are being re-examined taking into account the changing needs. For instance, 
the Human Development Index, a combination of life expectancy, education and per capita 
income and which was proposed in 1990s, has recognized own limitations and is 
undergoing a review with the aim to include more of what the human development 
entails."31  
Therefore identifying emerging players on the rapidly evolving global stage can be done 
only through a comprehensive country-level performance assessment through multiple 
indicators and taking into account: 
• socio-economic factors,  
• human and natural capital,  
• military and defence capabilities, and   
• an enabling environment. 
The corresponding indicator families mentioned above must be reviewed through the lens 
of competitiveness and strategic autonomy, assessing the global money flows from private 
and governmental bodies and considering geopolitical influences and interests.  
Table 1. Graphical presentation of proposed concept
 
                                                 
31 http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi (accessed online, October 2019) 
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Methodology  
It is proposed to address the issue through the quantitative and qualitative approaches:  
 Interdisciplinary composite index building → Composite indicators would provide a 
quantitative and measurable overview of the country level performance based on 
predefined indicators that are selected in line with the new economic thinking. 
Relationship and interdependence measurement will be the distinguishing feature of 
this assessment part.  
 Horizon scanning and trend impact analyses → as developed by the Millennium 
Project research team, suggesting multiple levels of differentiated research 
methodologies32.    
Table 2. Results from initial JRC assessment through the multilayer inclusive assessment criteria (ongoing 
elaboration, not finalised yet)  
 
Any interpretation of the results should be assessed from the angle of the question posed. 
In many cases the average country-level performance results can be totally changed if a 
‘per capita’ criterion is added or if urban and non-urban country-level disparities are 
factored in. The distinction should therefore be made and the final results should be 
                                                 
32 http://www.millennium-project.org/publications-2/futures-research-methodology-version-3-0/  
 15 
presented from multiple perspectives, allowing policymakers to better understand the 
situation.  
The driving forces are defined as the internal or external factors that directly influence the 
country-level performance. Internal driving forces would look at broader factors of the 
human development, population, urbanisation, education, skills, competencies and 
innovation, etc. External driving forces would look at country-level performance from the 
human geography aspects, regional location, social and political trends, in-migration, 
financial capital flows, economic conditions and interdependence, etc.  
For this reason, a mere numeric compilation of various indicators, data and figures is not in 
itself sufficient to understand the actual situation on the ground or to tailor bilateral and 
regional relations. One must therefore assess together the driving forces and influences 
behind aggregated numbers. 
The traditional approach to development tends to emphasise public funding and focus on 
donors' impact on a country's development strategy. By contrast, a business and market-
friendly approach focuses on creating the legal and governance structures where  
entrepreneurship and innovation build upon the availability of human, intellectual and 
natural resources, which in turn empower internal agents to maintain and drive forward the 
process themselves. The assessment criteria and indicators that we will propose will be 
chosen for their ability to reveal and measure a country's own capacity to put forward and 
implement the necessary reforms.  
In addition, partnerships and networks can provide insight into countries’ own ability to 
form alliances and spheres of influence. The accumulated experience, local practices and 
knowledge are better shared with regional neighbouring partner countries that face similar 
challenges, making therefore South-South development solutions as a valuable 
complementary tool to existing North-South development cooperation. The scaling up of 
Triangular cooperation, when traditional donors support South-South cooperation through 
financial or technical or knowledge transfer means is another way to foster local capacities.  
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The mapping of South-South and Triangular cooperation projects (OECD33, 2018 project 
data) reveals new emerging power centres and a changing landscape of international 
development cooperation.  
 
Table 3. South-South and Triangular cooperation network (SST project database, OECD, 2018)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/triangular-co-operation-repository.htm  
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4. Interdependence and strategic autonomy (How to rethink relationships in a changing 
world order?) 
 
The emergence of new global actors has shifted the international order so far dominated 
by the ‘Global North’. The concept of strategic autonomy is linked to the broader ambition 
of the EU as a global actor, aiming to defend vital interests: security, prosperity and 
democracy. Rather than implying autonomy in the sense of insulation from 
external dependencies, the notion of balance, dependence and interdependence in 
the highly interlinked and globalised environment of today is what is required.    
It is imperative to assess global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows and their relation to 
the Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows, to specify a country's interests, 
destinations and purpose. The balance between dependence from external interest and 
incoming support combined with its own internal capabilities and projected foreign relations 
strategy is delicate and one which determines a country's strategic autonomy and 
interdependence in globalized world (see graphics in the following pages).   
 18 
Table 4. Initial assessment of India's FDI interests (in and out flows, as well as balance, WB data 2012) 
 
 
 19 
Table 5. Initial assessment of ODA flows to India, (OECD data 2012)  
 
 20 
 
A strategic choice of instruments employing coercion or persuasion distinguishes a 
country's ability to affirm its presence through the use of soft and hard powers. While hard 
power is exercised through military presence, economic sanctions and monetary influence, 
soft power uses appeal and attraction, through international cooperation mechanisms, 
cultural and educational influence, language learning opportunities, tourism, talent 
attraction, gender balance as a cross-cutting issue, good governance and democracy. The 
decisions made reflect the underlying political priorities and guiding philosophical beliefs. 
As an example, since 2013 Costa Rica’s constitutional abolition of its army has received an 
honourable mention by the World Future Council34 and was recognised as one of the few 
states that have diverted the governmental spending for improvement of environment, 
education and health. In May 2019 New Zealand has announced its government's budget 
alignment35 with the transformative economy priorities, focusing on citizens' wellbeing, 
communities, inclusiveness, fairness and environmental concerns, instead of prior economic 
growth indicators. Consideration of internal policies and own society's benefits comes 
together with external policy alignment. In the case of New Zealand for example, well 
negotiated free trade agreement with China also works for the benefit of the country. The 
indicators we choose should therefore match our intention to assess countries’ interest in 
and care about their own population through internal and external drivers.  
Table 6.  Government spending for military purposes as % of the total government budget (SIPRI, 2018) 
 
 
                                                 
34 https://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/  
35 https://budget.govt.nz/budget/pdfs/wellbeing-budget/b19-wellbeing-budget.pdf  
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The analyses should be completed with the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ data36, as well as 
considering countries' legal framework and the rule of law, labour, social protection and 
general human rights framework (by OHCHR)37 as well as the Global Conflict Risk Index38 
done by the JRC of the European Commission.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 https://www.doingbusiness.org/  
37 http://indicators.ohchr.org  
38 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/peace-and-stability/projects/gcri  
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5. Future steps  
 
The concept hereby introduced suggests taking into account multiple criteria when 
assessing a country's performance level and determining the delicate balance between 
external forces and its own internal capabilities. The prevalent thinking follows the lines of 
post-Keynesian economics, with the aim of preparing government policies that work for 
people and the planet, should influence the selection of indicators and the assessment 
criteria. 
 
The next steps will be discussed in a workshop with invited internal and external experts. 
Participation will be decided with the aim of balancing geographical distribution and 
previous expertise in rethinking economics, taking into account EU policy interests. The 
workshop will aim to develop a multidimensional concept of assessing country-level 
information though a holistic approach on the basis of participatory methodology which will 
bring together practitioners, academics and policymakers as co-researchers. 
 
Discussion will focus on:  
 the proposed concept of a holistic ‘lens’ through which to review country-
level information; 
 the relevant existing knowledge; 
 the inclusiveness of the various elements to be taken into consideration; 
 availability of the most suitable sources of data and indicators; 
 matching data and indicators with the guiding principles of the new line of 
economic thinking. 
 
The suggested "first approach for discussion" will be revised into a new document and will 
serve as a basis to elaborate the methodology and technical specifications of the 
interdisciplinary composite index and interdependence relationship.  
 
The extensive review of available data and indicators will be done to make sure their 
emphasis is aligned with the strategic line of ‘an economy that works for people and the 
planet’. Choosing the right metrics that reflect and match the ultimate goals is a 
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must in this process that strives to align theory, practice, reporting and 
monitoring. Consensus building through the real-time Delphi methodology39 is the most 
efficient way to collect and synthesize expert opinions.  
 
To align and validate the methodology and data, a number of in-depth case studies will be 
performed on preselected countries of interest from policy DGs (according to currently used 
available indicators, though not yet fully aligned): 
 selected outperforming upper-middle income countries, like Brazil, South Korea, 
Mexico, Colombia,  Turkey, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and South Africa; 
 selected countries with a clear positive trend over the last years, as Indonesia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam, Ukraine, Bangladesh, Morocco, Ethiopia, 
Tajikistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Guatemala and Bolivia;  
 comprehensive in-depth case study analyses of a few selected fragile 
countries40 (some of them through qualitative case study examples).  
 
Following the preparatory stage of validation of the concept, a separate project will be 
defined to operationalise such emerging power monitoring capacity.  
 
Seeking to use verified and timely available SDG-related data, deriving from robust 
methods and quality assurance controls, we will look at the outcomes from the Data For 
Now41 initiative, anchored by four operating partners: the Global Partnership for Sustainable 
Development Data, the World Bank, the United Nations Statistics Division, and SDSN 
TReNDS. 
                                                 
39 http://www.millennium-project.org/rtd-general/  
40 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/peace-and-stability/projects/gcri  
41 http://www.data4sdgs.org/data4now  
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